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## KOCHANOWSKI, *LAMENT* 16.29-32: CICERO AND HIS ULTIMATE FAILURE

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The *Lament* 16 of Jan Kochanowski addresses in its central part a distinguished adversary, whose deeds and teachings are subject to a critical evaluation, with conclusions highly unfavourable and questioning credibility of his claims – Marcus Tullius Cicero. Kochanowski selects three episodes from Cicero's life in order to contrast his own behaviour with assertions and prescriptions formulated in his works. First, Cicero's exile is mentioned:

Przec z płaczem idziesz, Arpinie wymowny,  
Z miłej ojczyzny? Wszak nie Rzym budowny,  
Ale świat wszystkim Miastem jest mądrymu  
Widzeniu twemu<sup>1</sup>.

Next, Tullia's death is recorded:

Czemu tak barzo córki swej żałujesz?  
Wszak sie ty tylko sromoty wiarujesz;  
Insze wszelakie u ciebie przygody  
Ledwe nie gody<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> J. Kochanowski, *Lament* 16.21-24. *Laments* are cited after the edition *Jan Kochanowski, Treny*, ed. M.R. Mayenowa, L. Woronczakowa, J. Axer and M. Cytowska, Wrocław 1983. Translation: „Wordy Arpinian, why in tears do you roam / From your beloved homeland? Not glorious Rome, / But the world is the City of the wise man / In your judgment”. Translations are cited from edition J. Kochanowski, *Treny – Laments*, translated by M.J. Mikoś, Constans 1995.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*, 16.25-28. Translation: „Why do you grieve so much for your daughter? / After all, you shun only dishonor; / You treat all the other adversities / Almost like bliss”.

The first two episodes are well known to Renaissance readers thanks to Cicero himself: both the exile of the great orator and his daughter's death being the circumstances of these infelicitous events, finally, Cicero's reactions are either described by Cicero or may be reconstructed on the basis of his texts, and all are sufficiently known throughout the Renaissance period. Details of Cicero's life had famously provoked a negative reaction of Petrarch, who, albeit on the basis of a different selection of events than Kochanowski, came to a similar conclusion – Cicero, while giving directions to others, had turned unable to live in accordance with high standards set up by himself: „heu et fraterni consilii immemor et tuorum tot salubrium praeceptorum, ceu nocturnus viator lumen in tenebris gestans, ostendisti secuturis callem, in quo ipse satis miserabiliter lapsus es”<sup>3</sup>.

The third event in the chain of examples of conduct standing in disagreement with officially held doctrines is Cicero's death:

Śmierć, mówisz, straszna tylko niezbożnemu;  
Przecze się tobie umrzeć cnotliwemu  
Nie chciało, kiedyś prze dotkliwą mowę  
Miał podać głowę?<sup>4</sup>

This reference has proven a more controversial example than the preceding ones as a basis for accusations directed at Cicero. Commentators explicitly invoke Plutarch's narrative, leaving, however, the exact location in dark<sup>5</sup>; once one turns to Plutarch's account in the final sections of Cicero's *Life*, Kochanowski's complaints do not appear as justified as in the other two cases – indeed, as far as the

<sup>3</sup> Petrarch, *Fam.* 24.3. Cp. J. Kochanowski, *Lament* 16.33-35: „Wywiodłeś wszystkim, nie wywiodłeś sobie; / Łacniej rzec, widzę, niż czynić i tobie, / Pióro anielskie”. Translation: „You convinced all but yourself, Arpinian; / I see, for you too, easier said than done; / O, angelic quill”. On Petrarch's letters to Cicero in the context of the biographical tradition, see B.L. Cook, *Tully's Late Medieval Life. The Roots of the Renaissance in Cicero's Biography*, „Classica et Mediaevalia” 60 (2009), p. 347-370.

<sup>4</sup> J. Kochanowski, *Lament* 16.29-32. Translation: „«Death», you say, «frightens only the godless»; / Why did you not want to die, virtuous, / When because of the insults which you said, / You risked your head?”.

<sup>5</sup> T. Sinko, *Wzory „Trenów” Kochanowskiego*, „Eos” 22 (1917), p. 77-136, at p. 107: „Wreszcie konkluzją drugiej książki Tuskulanek jest przekonanie, że śmierć straszna jest tylko dla złych; dla dobrych jest ona czemś radosnem. Kochanowski wiedział, choćby z opowiadania Plutarcha, że Cycero nie praktykował tej wiary, gdy mu groziła śmierć z ręki siepaczków Antoniusza, obrażonego gwałtownemi filipkami”; this vague reference to Plutarch is repeated in Sinko's commentary of 1919 (the commentary of J. Pelc, on the other hand, whose edition has replaced the edition of Sinko in the series *Biblioteka Narodowa* since 1969, does not give any textual references). The commentary in the Szymon Edition (n. 1 above) does not extend the textual basis of Kochanowski's reference, either: „myśl, że człowiek cnotliwy powinien być wolny od strachu przed śmiercią, wypowiada Cyceron często [...]. Stwierdzenia te kontrastują ze znanymi Kochanowskiemu literackimi opisami ostatniego okresu życia Cycerona i okoliczności, w których zginął (najobszerniejsza relacja u Plutarcha); podkreśla się w nich, jak bardzo filozof starał się uniknąć śmierci”.

story of final moments of Cicero's life is concerned, the impression is quite opposite: Cicero behaves in a dignified manner; in the translation of Jacopo Angeli da Scarperia (plagiarized by Achille Bocchi), the passage runs thus:

Verum Cicero ut percussores imminere cognovit, suis uti lecticam sisterent imperavit; inde ceu persaepe consueverat, cum genam sinistrae imposuisset, immotis oculis percussores prospiciens iugulum apparat<sup>6</sup>.

For more than forty years since the *editio princeps* of the Latin version of Plutarch's *Lives*, which appeared in Rome in 1470, the text printed as Cicero's biography was Leonardo Bruni's *Cicero Novus*, which, narrating the whole story in a much more compact way, preserves the essence of Plutarch's account of Cicero's last moments<sup>7</sup>. This may be perplexing in view of Kochanowski's harsh criticism; and indeed, it was claimed that Sinko had been wrong in referring to Plutarch on this occasion<sup>8</sup>. The biographical tradition of Cicero's death does not provide much support for a hypothesis that Kochanowski follows another version of the story<sup>9</sup>. Of more extensive narratives of these events, only Appian (*Civil Wars* 4.19-20) does not explicitly stress Cicero's courageous behaviour in the last minutes of his life, a reticence hardly sufficient for justifying explicit criticisms. The heroic tradition is notably present also in Livy's account, which has an additional property – it is preserved in *Controversiae* and *Suasoriae*, a corpus of texts which only gradually become attributed to their proper authors, and due to the medieval manuscript attributions begin their Renaissance life as having

<sup>6</sup> *Plutarchi Chaeronei, Historici ac Philosophi Gravissimi, Graecorum Romanorumque Illustrium Vitae*, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1558, fol. 406v (Plutarch, *Cicero* 48.3).

<sup>7</sup> For a general account of the reception of Plutarch's *Lives* in Quattrocento, see M. Pade, *The Reception of Plutarch's Lives in Fifteenth-Century Italy*, Copenhagen 2007; on Latin translations, see V.R. Giustiniani, *Sulle traduzioni latine delle „Vite” di Plutarco nel Quattrocento*, „Rinascimento” 1 (1961), p. 3-62; on Bruni's work see further E. Fryde, *The Beginnings of Italian Humanist Historiography: The „New Cicero” of Leonardo Bruni*, „The English Historical Review” 95 (1980), p. 533-552; G. Ianziti, *The Plutarchan Option. Leonardo Bruni's Early Career in History, 1405-1414*, „I Tatti Studies. Essays in the Renaissance”, 8 (1999), p. 11-35; idem, *A Life in Politics: Leonardo Bruni's „Cicero”*, „Journal of the History of Ideas” 61 (2000), p. 39-58; P. Botley, *Latin Translation in the Renaissance. The Theory and Practice of Leonardo Bruni*, Giannozzo Manetti and Desiderius Erasmus, Cambridge 2004.

<sup>8</sup> See S. Grzeszczuk, *Kochanowski i inni*, Katowice 1981, p. 114: „Relacja Plutarcha świadczy raczej o tym, iż Cycero zachował się w obliczu śmierci z godnością, jak przystało wielbicielowi Sokratesa. [...] Kochanowski nie poszedł jednak za tą wersją legendy biograficznej Cycerona. Przyjął jej kształt odmienny, lub też odmiennie interpretował opowieść Plutarcha o ostatnim okresie życia filozofa z Arpinum”.

<sup>9</sup> For details of the biographical tradition of Cicero's death, see H. Homeyer, *Die Quellen zu Cicero's Tod*, „Helikon” 17 (1977), p. 56-96; M.B. Roller, *Color-blindness. Cicero's death, declamation, and the production of history*, „Classical Philology” 92 (1997), p. 109-130; A. Wright, *The Death of Cicero. Forming a Tradition: the Contamination of History*, „Historia” 50 (2001), p. 436-452.

been written by the Seneca, viz. the philosopher – beside philosophical works ultimately ascribed to him, the corpus contains works whose authenticity is variously challenged during the humanist period<sup>10</sup>. *Controversiae* and *Suasoriae* are printed among the works of Seneca the philosopher throughout the Renaissance, and it is only with 1580's that the attribution of these works changes – first, with the publication of Justus Lipsius' *Electorum liber primus* in 1580, then with the posthumous edition of Seneca's *opera* by Marc-Antoine Muret in 1585. Lipsius argues in the very first chapter of *Electa* that, for chronological and stylistic reasons, *Controversiae* and *Suasoriae* could not have been written by Seneca the philosopher and attributes them to Seneca's father:

Quis falsus scriptor satis dictum; dicam quis verus, tam clare id ipsum, ut si quid hac parte errem, non recusem quin Fides aversa a me in omne aevum. L. Annaeus Seneca Philosophus patrem habuit nomine et cognomine eodem. [...] Eius, inquam, Senecae hi libri<sup>11</sup>.

Similarly, it was Muret's opinion that these works had not been written by Seneca the philosopher, although it did not affect their inclusion in his edition; it was Lipsius who in his *magnum opus*, the 1605 edition of Seneca's *opera*, left them entirely out as belonging to another author<sup>12</sup>. Livy's narrative

<sup>10</sup> *De quattuor virtutibus* was announced a non-Senecan work already by Petrarch, who attributed the work to Martin of Braga in his *Epistolae seniles* 2.4 („Senecae libellus, nolenti non dubitem, datus est, cuius titulus est *De quattuor virtutibus*. Omne vulgus opusculum illud avidissime legit ac Senecae libris interserit, inque eo quod Seneca numquam vidit, Senecam praedicant miranturque [...] is quidem liber Martini cuiusdam est episcopi...”), although at the beginning of the print period the work continues to be published as Seneca's text. Senecan authorship of the alleged correspondence between Seneca and St. Paul comes under attack in the early Renaissance period, the letters being declared a forgery by Angelo Decembrio and Lorenzo Valla (see further L.A. Panizza, *Gasparino Barzizza's commentaries on Seneca's letters*, „Traditio” 33 (1977), p. 297-358, on the fate of the correspondence in the fifteenth century). Consequently, *De quattuor virtutibus*, the Paul-Seneca correspondence, as much as the collection of *sententiae* copied under the name of Seneca, are all printed already in 1515 Seneca edition prepared by Erasmus in a separate part as those that „licet erudita”, are nevertheless „a Senecae stilo abhorrentia”. For a broader picture, see also M. Colish, *Stoicism and the New Testament*, in: *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*, ed. W. Haase, vol. 2.21, Berlin 1992, p. 334-379. On the vagaries of the attribution of tragedies found in the Senecan corpus until the publication of Martin del Rio's *Syntagma tragoediae Latinae* (1593-1594), see R. Mayer, *Personata Stoa. Neostoicism and Senecan Tragedy*, „Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes” 57 (1994), p. 151-174. An account of the manuscript tradition of the Senecan corpus may be found in: *Texts and transmission. A Survey of the Latin Classics*, ed. L.D. Reynolds, Oxford 1983, p. 357-381.

<sup>11</sup> J. Lipsius, *Electorum liber primus*, Antverpiae, ex officina Christophori Plantini, 1580, p. 20-21. The recurring error of attributing the detection of Seneca's the Elder authorship to Muretus is corrected in J. Kraye, *The Humanist as Moral Philosopher. Marc-Antoine Muret's 1585 Edition of Seneca*, in: *Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity*, ed. J. Kraye and R. Saarinen, Berlin 2005, p. 307-330.

<sup>12</sup> See J. Kraye, op. cit., p. 314-315 with nn. 39 and 41. *Controversiae* and *Suasoriae* are clearly separated as works of Seneca the Elder for the first time in the edition of Seneca published by Nicholas Faber (Paris 1587).

as cited in *Suasoriae* depicted Cicero deciding to die in the country he himself had saved:

„moriar’ inquit ‚in patria saepe servata’. Satis constat servos fortiter fideliterque paratos fuisse ad dimicandum; ipsum deponi lecticam et quietos pati quod fors iniqua cogeret iussisse. Prominenti ex lectica praebentique immotam cervicem caput praecisum est<sup>13</sup>.

*Suasoriae* and *Controversiae* contain much more material relevant for the biographical tradition, but traces of a tradition hostile to Cicero are meagre. To rely on them in the context of the *Lament* 16 would result in a sudden puzzle for a reader – Asinius Pollio would be hardly a figure to obviously *come* to mind. Yet Plutarch *does* provide a clear basis for Kochanowski’s claim, which is concerned with circumstances of Cicero’s death – but not necessarily the moment of death itself. Plutarch’s account of events preceding the murder provides a story of continuous changes of mind on the part of Cicero, and makes him travel a route full of twists and turns (the most complicated one in accounts which give any detail). Still, it does not lead to overtly critical remarks. Plutarch follows his common practice of refraining from comments and suppressing controversial issues in the narrative of a final period of one’s life, only to express his views explicitly in a *comparatio* which follows a pair of lives<sup>14</sup>. In the case at hand, Plutarch compares Demosthenes and Cicero, and his judgment concerning Cicero’s last hours is plainly unfavourable:

Ante omnia vero ab obitu deplorandum hunc putem, quando homo senex et nobilitate clarus, a servis sursum deorsum circumlatus, mortem fugitando, caesores suos fallere cuperet, qui in eo tollendo vix momento naturam antevertebant, a quibus mox trucidabatur<sup>15</sup>.

*Comparisons* which Plutarch adds to pairs of lives serve clear moral aims – they provide an opportunity to assess qualities of character of his heroes and to give readers grounds for reasonable choices of a model to follow in their own conduct; the last period of one’s life provides an excellent occasion to estimate the quality of one’s life as a whole. It may readily subvert a favourable opinion; and in case it is philosopher’s life which is evaluated, a discrepancy between his words and deeds is taken to reflect the worthlessness of his teachings, unsuitable in particular to serve as directions for a mastery of a *techne tou biou*, an art of living well. It is a part of a traditional stock of arguments against philosophical

<sup>13</sup> Seneca the Elder, *Suasoriae* 6.17.

<sup>14</sup> See further T. Duff, *Plutarch’s Lives. Exploring Virtue and Vice*, Oxford 2000, p. 243-309.

<sup>15</sup> *Plutarchi... Vitae* (n. 6 above), fol. 407v (Plutarch, *Cicero* 54 [*Synkrisis* 5]). For the record, let it be noted that Angeli’s translation „nobilitate clarus” is an attempt to make sense of a corrupt text. An expression of a similarly critical judgment of Cicero, but concerning generally his conduct in life, is reported of Asinius Pollio in *Suasoriae* 6.24: „utinam moderatius secundas res et fortius adversas ferre potuisset!”.

doctrines to use such arguments; Cicero himself is fond of pointing out such discrepancies with the aim to disparage a philosophical opponent on the basis of a principle traced back to Socrates:

Sic enim princeps ille philosophiae disserebat: qualis cuiusque animi adfectus esset, talem esse hominem; qualis autem homo ipse esset, talem eius esse orationem; orationi autem facta similia, factis vitam. Adfectus autem animi in bono viro laudabilis; et vita igitur laudabilis boni viri; et honesta ergo, quoniam laudabilis. Ex quibus bonorum beatam vitam esse concluditur<sup>16</sup>.

The requirement of consistency in life and congruency between life and teachings is traditionally imposed on philosophers – as Plutarch states (in Janus Cornarius' translation),

Primum omnium expeto, ut dogmatum professio in ipsa vita conspicua sit. Non enim adeo oportet rhetorem idem dicere quod legem, velut Aeschines ait, sicut vitam philosophi sermoni consonam esse (sermo enim philosophi lex voluntaria et privata existit), sin sane non ludum et loquacitatem ad opinionem parandam, sed opus maxime serium, velut utique est, philosophiam opinantur<sup>17</sup>.

Plutarch's Cicero is not a philosopher; Plutarch's critical judgment is, then, formulated explicitly – no need for a reinterpretation of the narrative of Cicero's last hours, no puzzle for a reader – but requires, instead, taking it to apply to Cicero viewed as principally a philosopher, not an orator involved in political activity.

Finding sufficient grounds for such reproaches immediately disqualifies one as a philosopher in the „nonprofessional” meaning of the term, well established in the antiquity and much in vogue in Renaissance discussions of philosophy, designating someone as possessing and exercising successfully a *techne tou biou*. It is also devastating for the reputation of a philosopher in the „professional” meaning – provided we stick to demands as quoted above. Philosophical texts of Cicero are held in a high esteem throughout both Middle Ages and Renaissance, serving simultaneously as a resource to obtain knowledge about doctrines of various schools reported in his works and as philosophical works *simpliciter* – suffice it to mention the enormous influence that *De officiis* came to play in the emergence and development of early modern political philosophy<sup>18</sup>. It is important to

<sup>16</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan disputations* 5.47. To take but one example, this is the way in which Epicurus' doctrine is discredited in *De finibus* 2.99: „nihil in hac praeclara epistula scriptum ab Epicuro congruens et conveniens decretis eius reperietis. ita redarguitur ipse a sese, convincunturque scripta eius probitate ipsius ac moribus”.

<sup>17</sup> *Plutarchi Chaeronei... Ethica sive moralia opera*, Basileae: apud Michaellem Insigninum 1554, fol. 240D (Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 1033A-B); see further J. Mansfeld, *Prolegomena. Questions to be settled before the study of an author, or a text*, Leiden 1994, esp. p. 176-191, with copious references.

<sup>18</sup> See already H. Baron, *La rinascita dell'etica statale romana nell'umanesimo fiorentino del Quattrocento*, „Civiltà Moderna” 7 (1935), p. 3-31; idem, *Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in*

note that the sixteenth century witnesses a fervent discussion about the merits of Cicero's philosophical works, not as merely doxographical texts (which would rather restrict controversies to Cicero's reliability as a source), but as pieces of genuine philosophy. In 1538, Celio Calcagnini writes *Disquisitiones aliquot in libros officiorum Ciceronis*, subjecting Cicero's views and presentation of the matter to a highly critical scrutiny<sup>19</sup>. A defender of Cicero in this controversy, Marcantonio Maioragio<sup>20</sup> publishes in 1546 a fierce polemical work directed at Cicero – philosopher, *Antiparadoxon*<sup>21</sup>, in which he confesses to have changed his mind about philosophical qualities of Cicero's *Paradoxa*, a work which „plerique ut sacrosancta venerantur et religioni nostrae maximae consentanea existimant”<sup>22</sup>:

Eo animo quasi ludibundus disputationem hanc contra Ciceronis Paradoxa conscribere coeperam, ut exponendis rationibus, quae contra dici posse viderentur, eas postea refellerem. Sed dicam vere. Simile mihi quiddam evenit, quod plerisque philosophis ac theologis accidere solet, qui dum arduas de Deo ac de animorum immortalitate quaestiones proposuerint, quas deinde solvere nesciunt, incerti quo ferantur, tandem in Diagorae Melii et Theodori Cyrenaici opinionem delabuntur. Eodem ego fere modo cum adductus in Ciceronem a me rationes refellere non possem, in eam statim discessi sententiam [...] ut meas rationes veras, Paradoxa vero Ciceronis falsa esse crederem<sup>23</sup>.

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*the Middle Ages and the Early Renaissance*, „Bulletin of the John Rylands Library” 22 (1938), p. 3-28.

<sup>19</sup> Calcagnini's criticism goes so far as to disapprove even of the title itself: „Primo mihi titulus non plane satisfacit, *De officiis*. Nam plenius atque uberius *De officio* existimassem”. (*Caelii Calcagnini, Ferrariensis, Protonotarii apostolici, opera aliquot*, Basileae: apud Frobenium, 1544, p. 254); on Calcagnini, see further Q. Breen, *Celio Calcagnini (1479-1541)*, „Church History” 21 (1952), p. 225-238.

<sup>20</sup> Maioragio opposes Calcagnini in *Decisiones XXV quibus M. Tullium Ciceronem ab omnibus Caelii Calcagnini criminationibus liberat*, Lugduni: apud Gryphium, 1544, a work written with much rhetorical vehemence, simultaneously defending Cicero's Latin and attacking Calcagnini's style („Nam quid magis audax aut temerarium esse potest, quam te hominem vulgaris, ut res ipsa declarat, eruditionis de Cicerone iudicium ferre voluisse?” – op. cit., p. 10), but also – importantly – addressing charges against Cicero's philosophical discussion and justifying his highly favourable opinion about Cicero's merits as a philosopher: „Quam quidem meam operam ac laborem spero bonis omnibus gratissimam ac iucundissimam futuram, vobisque in primis, qui tantum iam profecistis in literis, ut admirabilem ac divinam Ciceronis intelligentiam et doctrinam agnoscatis. Illud enim mihi persuasum est, non posse Ciceronem ab eis non vehementer amari, qui singulares eius virtutes intelligunt” (op. cit., p. 7).

<sup>21</sup> *M. Antonii Majoragii Antiparadoxon sive suburbanarum questionum libri sex, in quibus M. Tulli Ciceronis omnia paradoxa refelluntur*, Lugduni: apud Gryphium, 1546. See further Q. Breen, *The Antiparadoxon of Marcantonius Majoragius or, A Humanist Becomes a Critic of Cicero as a Philosopher*, „Studies in the Renaissance” 5 (1958), p. 37-48 (with a useful discussion of the Christianized Platonistic background of the work).

<sup>22</sup> Maioragio, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 4-5.

*Antiparadoxon*, in turn, provoked Mario Nizolio to answer with an *Epistola ad M. Majoragium*, followed by an exchange of *Apologia* (Maioragio), *Antapologia* (Nizolio), and *Reprehensionum libri duo ad M. Nizolium* (Maioragio), the controversy culminating with Nizolio's *De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi* (1553), with a prefatory epistle „Nizolius ad lectores contra Majoragium” – an important work belonging to the group of anti-Aristotelian treatises of the century<sup>24</sup>. Apart from the stylistic controversies, and beside the activity of editors and commentators, Cicero's philosophical works give thus rise to significant discussions concerning methodological and substantive issues.

Although Cicero was frequently associated with the distinctively Roman blend of Stoicism, his texts were taken to provide support for various philosophical stances<sup>25</sup>, and even if a Stoic affiliation is predominant, it is not so without modification and reservations. True, Cicero provides a wealth of material on Stoic teachings, and does so with a more or less explicit approval; true (and of relevance for our present concerns), he finds Stoicism particularly suitable as a philosophy-*qua*-therapy in difficult moments of one's life<sup>26</sup>; yet neither such passages, nor the biographical tradition of Cicero provide a basis for referring to him as a Stoic *tout court*; using a distinction Stoics themselves make use of, he could not be taken to be a Stoic *sapiens*, but merely a *proficiens* – someone who is only on a route to wisdom, on a path of progress.

The sentiment that Stoic requirements imposed upon a man who may be truly called wise are entirely unrealistic and either wholly beyond the reach of a human being or satisfiable only by exceptional individuals, hence not suitable as rules for living for ordinary mortals, recurs throughout the Renaissance, from its dawn to the final period. Salutati, in a letter written in 1401 to Francesco Zabarella<sup>27</sup>, having proposed to discuss whether philosophical remedies to grief and sorrow

<sup>24</sup> For an extensive discussion of Nizolio and his works, see the introduction in: Mario Nizolio, *De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudophilosophos. Libri IV*, ed. Q. Breen, Roma 1956; see also idem, *Nizolius' Defensiones... Contra Disquisitiones C. Calcagnini*, „Rinascimento” 6 (1955), p. 195-208.

<sup>25</sup> For the use of Cicero as a source and/or supporter of a sceptical position, see Ch.B. Schmitt, *Cicero Scepticus. A Study of the Influence of the Academia in the Renaissance*, Hague 1972; R.H. Popkin, *The History of Scepticism: from Savonarola to Bayle*, Oxford 2003. Of special importance for the present discussion is the commentary tradition on Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, on which see the remarks of J. Papy, *The First Christian Defender of Stoic Virtue? Justus Lipsius and Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum*, in: *Christian Humanism: Essays in Honour of Arjo Vanderjagt*, ed. A.J. Vanderjagt, A.A. MacDonald, Z.R.W.M. von Martels and J.R. Veenstra, Leiden 2009, p. 139-153.

<sup>26</sup> See further, e.g., A. Erskine, *Cicero and the expression of grief*, in: *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature*, ed. S. Braund and Ch. Gill, Cambridge 1997, p. 36-47; M. Graver, *Cicero on the emotions: Tusculan disputations 3 and 4*, Chicago 2002, passim; on philosophy as therapy in general: M. Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*, Princeton 1994.

<sup>27</sup> C. Salutati, *Epistolario*, ed. F. Novati, 4 vols, Rome 1891-1911, vol. III, p. 456-479.



offered by Cicero and others could actually turn what they promised to be<sup>28</sup>, invokes in one phrase Stoics, Cicero and Seneca, and counts Cicero as one of the proponents of the thesis that virtue is the only good<sup>29</sup> – a view with which Aristotle’s opinion is contrasted as supporting the claim that death, among other terrible things, should be considered evil, which it is irreproachable to be afraid of. Stoics’ demands to make virtue the only good and to act accordingly in life are unequivocally rejected as unreasonable:

Clama, si placet; clamet et omnis Stoicorum scola; potior est michi veritas, que patet ad sensum, quam opinio, ne dicam deliratio, Stoicorum, qui virtutem invisam et invidendam talem esse volebant actusque virtutum qualis et quales in hac carne fragilitateque mortalium sit impossibile reperiri. Maior est auctoritas aristotelica Peripateticorumque moderatio, quam illa severitas, imo duricies et inaccessibilis ratio Stoicorum<sup>30</sup>.

Objections of this kind accompany Stoic ethical doctrine from antiquity and persist despite a generally favourable attitude towards Stoicism as such, much buttressed by the authority of St. Jerome and his remarks to the effect that Stoics „nostro dogmati in plerisque concordant”<sup>31</sup> – an opinion which, however, did not make its author engage in a serious attempt to incorporate Stoic teachings into the Christian doctrine: to use M. Colish’s words, „Jerome treats Stoicism in an essentially decorative manner”<sup>32</sup>.

Stoic postulates found their defenders and supporters; thus, Poliziano undertakes an attempt to defend Epictetus against the charges of Bartolomeo Scala who,

<sup>28</sup> „Nunc autem ad id veniam quod impugnas tecumque fraterne discutiam an illa Ciceronis et aliorum philosophorum in adhibenda merentibus consolatione remedia talia sint, qualia promittuntur”; C. Salutati, op. cit., p. 459.

<sup>29</sup> „Verum contra me Stoicos, Ciceronem, Senecam et alios multos statuens, inquis istos nolle malum aliquid esse nisi vitium, nec bonum nisi virtutem. Scio Ciceronis et aliorum Stoicidarum hanc perpetuam esse sententiam...”; C. Salutati, op. cit., p. 461.

<sup>30</sup> C. Salutati, op. cit., p. 463. Salutati thus retreats from the position held in *De laboribus Herculis*, where the Stoic approach to virtue is claimed to be closest to its real nature (cp. 3.25: „Aretusa quidem competit Stoycis, qui super alios ad vere virtutis essentiam acerrimis disputationibus accedebant et virtutes potius in semet quam prout homini possunt contingere finiebant”; *Colucii Salutatis de laboribus Herculis*, ed. B.L. Ullmann, Turici 1951); see further R.G. Witt, *Hercules at the Crossroads. The Life, Works, and Thought of Coluccio Salutati*, Durham 1983.

<sup>31</sup> St. Jerome, *In Esaia* 4.11.

<sup>32</sup> M.L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages*, vol. 2: *Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought Through the Sixth Century*, Leiden 1990, p. 72. A brief survey of Renaissance charges against the Stoics is provided in J. Kraye, *Moral philosophy*, in: *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. Ch. Schmitt, Q. Skinner, E. Kessler and J. Kraye, Cambridge 1988, p. 303-386. The general topic of control over emotions in ancient Stoicism continues to provoke much scholarly discussion, see in particular R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation*, Oxford 2000; idem, *Self. Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life and Death*, Chicago 2006; M.R. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, Chicago 2007 (with further copious references).

beside making a general point of their excessively demanding character, insists in particular that death of children or wife must be considered a natural cause of grief, an emotion which it would be beyond human capabilities to eradicate:

Non videlicet perturbatum iri nos (si haec praemeditata nobis fuerint) liberorum aut uxoris morte, huic tu praecepto naturae augustum nomen quod maximum (ut physici dicunt) ad omnis affectus momentum habeat, quasi Aiacis illum clipeum, obiectas. Naturae enim, inquis, imperio gemimus. An vero hic noster lacrimas arcet, qui etiam praecipiat, ut vel in alienis luctibus, si opus sit, conferamus gemitus pariterque fleamus? [...] Multos autem legimus in carissimorum sibi pignorum obitu lacrimis fletuque abstinuisse. [...] Non sunt quidem haec factu facilia, non supra hominis tamen sunt vires. Si das in uno hoc aut altero, dabis profecto et multis<sup>33</sup>.

It is, then, not impossible for a man to live according to Stoic rules even when faced with extreme conditions; but, simultaneously, more and more fine grained distinctions are made so as to distinguish various levels of philosophical maturity and adjust requirements accordingly. The most general strategy is to adopt a clear-cut division between a perfectly wise man, one of whom we may and should expect a behaviour prescribed by the most stringent Stoic rules; and all those who – however striving to achieve lofty Stoic goals – are only in the middle of a long and arduous travels to wisdom. For the latter – at least, the majority of adepts of philosophy, if not all of them – Stoic admonitions are to be considered as directing toward remote goals, perhaps attainable only in principle, in need to adjustments and corrections when applied to real-life situations. This strategy had been employed already by Cicero himself in his speech in defence of L. Licinius Murena, when, having exposed Stoic precepts as intolerably harsh, he suggested, addressing Cato, the following interpretation of their status:

Ac te ipsum, quantum ego opinione auguror, nunc et animi quodam impetu concitatum et vi naturae atque ingeni elatum et recentibus praeceptorum studiis flagrantem iam usus flectet, dies leniet, aetas mitigabit. Etenim isti ipsi mihi videntur vestri praeceptores et virtutis magistri finis officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet protulisse ut, cum ad ultimum animo contendissemus, ibi tamen ubi oporteret consistere. „Nihil ignoveris.” Immo aliquid, non omnia. „Nihil gratiae causa feceris.” Immo resistito gratiae, cum officium et fides postulabit. „Misericordia commotus ne sis.” Etiam, in dissolvenda severitate; sed tamen est laus aliqua humanitatis. „In sententia permaneto.” Vero, nisi sententiam sententia alia vicerit melior<sup>34</sup>.

Cicero's words remained entrenched in the memory of Renaissance readers of Stoic texts; their echo may be found in the preface to Hieronymus Wolf's edition of *Enchiridion*:

<sup>33</sup> *Omnia opera Angeli Politiani*, Venetiis: apud Aldum, 1498, sigs T2v-T3r. On Poliziano's work on the *Enchiridion*, see further R.P. Oliver, *Politian's Translation of the Enchiridion*, „Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association” 89 (1958), p. 185-217.

<sup>34</sup> Cicero, *Pro Murena* 65–66.

Scio paradoxa Stoicorum improbari a multis, quorum et Ludovicus Carinus fuit, doctissimus et humanissimus senex. [...] Idem tamen non negabat, utile esse in omni doctrinae genere formam apponere perfectissimam, ad quam quo quisque propius accessisset, eo melior et praestantior haberetur; contraque deterior, qui ab eadem longissime recessisset<sup>35</sup>.

It is also precisely Cicero's words that are quoted in the final section of Lipsius' *Manuductio*, when Lipsius begins an exhortation to apply Stoic teachings to real life:

Hortandus tantum es in animum dicta admittere, ad usum et opus exserere, id est facere fructum. [...] Exemplaria quaedam ista perfectae virtutis sunt; adnitere, citra consistes. Cicero hoc ad Catonem: *Mihi videntur praeceptores vestri et virtutis magistri fines officiorum paulo longius protulisse ut, cum ad ultimum animo contendissemus, ibi tamen ubi oporteret consistere*<sup>36</sup>.

It is significant that it is Cicero who is invoked as a supporter of such a position, which may be applied to himself as a *proficiens*, and which might be argued to be a reasonable stance toward a Christianized version of Stoicism – as providing a set of goals set too high to be achievable, but sufficient to secure a moral progress. The failure of Cicero, strongly argued for in *Lament* 16, would be, then, symptomatic of inadequacy and insufficiency of a Stoic way of moral *progress*.

The incompatibility between the two positions, Stoic and Christian, was deeply felt by John of Salisbury, who closes his account of the Stoic position on the fate, having recalled the consequences for the role of astrology and for the free will debate, thus:

Errores istos incommoda multa sequuntur,  
Quod vitare pium, sed numerare labor.  
Exaequat culpas poenaque coaequat eadem

<sup>35</sup> *Epicteti Enchiridion, hoc est Pugio, sive Ars humanae vitae correctrix*, Basileae: per Ioannem Oporinum, 1561, p. 14. Wolf proceeds to present an argument in favour of interpreting Stoic postulate of eradication of emotions along such lines: „Facile itaque mihi concedebat *apatheian* recte proponi iis, qui suis affectibus nimium indulgerent. Nam vel sic *metriopatheian* vix impetrari a vehementioribus ingeniis. [...] Persuasum enim habeo Stoicos aut hoc suae magniloquentiae consilium et admirabilium sententiarum habuisse, et mercatorio atque etiam oratorio more iniquum postulasse ut aequum ferrent; aut omnium mortalium fuisse stupidissimos atque insolentissimos, ne impudentissimos dicam: stupidissimos, si vel in semet ipsis non animadverterent istam perfectionem non cadere in hominis naturam; impudentissimos, si aliis persuadere conarentur ea, quae ipsi sibi nondum persuasissent” (ibidem, p. 14-15).

<sup>36</sup> Lipsius, *Manuductio*, III. 24 (*Iusti Lipsi Manuductionis ad Stoicam philosophiam libri tres*, Antverpiae: apud Ioannem Moretum 1610). The passage of Cicero quoted above receives a marginal note in Latomus' edition: „Stoici proferunt fines officiorum ultra naturam, quia solum honestum in bonis numerant, omnia interim et corporis et fortunae commoda contemnentes” (*M. Tulli Ciceronis oratio pro Murena*, Parisii, 1561, p. 18). In an edition containing both Latomus' and Melanchton's notes, the commentary becomes much more judgmental: „Ratio reprehensionis, quia doctrina Stoica falsa est.” (*M. T. Ciceronis oratio lepidissima pro L. Murena*, Coloniae: apud Ioannem Gymnicum, 1540).

Stoicus, at contra pagina sacra facit.  
 In multis igitur legi consentit et idem  
 Adversus legem multa docere solet<sup>37</sup>.

The conclusion of John is much less favourable for the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of Stoic and Christian elements than Jerome's or even Augustine's. The evidence for various elements of the Stoic doctrine is only much more available and more thoroughly discussed in the sixteenth century, not only because several Greek Stoic texts are successively published, but also because main sources for both the original teaching and the specifically Roman variety of Stoicism, Cicero and Seneca, are given much editorial care. The picture of Stoicism which gradually emerges should not make one optimistic about prospects for a conciliatory resolution of tensions arising between Christian and Stoic world views; and the debate about free will which has one of its most heavy outbursts in the sixteenth century makes hopes for establishment of at least friendly relations, if not an assimilation, even fainter. Also a reader who might at first find the two systems in agreement over a number of issues, is likely to change his mind when a more considered reflection comes: as, basically, it happened to Erasmus, who expresses quite warm feelings toward Stoicism in the prefatory letter to the 1515 edition<sup>38</sup>, yet in 1529 is very explicit that assimilation of Seneca's Stoicism and Christianity is impossible:

Aliud est veste prophana Christum occultare, aliud est libris aeditis pugnare cum Christi dogmatibus; et aliud est silere de Christo, aliud illo indigna loqui. [...] Equidem arbitror magis in rem esse lectoris ut Senecae libros legat velut hominis ignari nostrae religionis. Etenim si legas illum ut paganum, scripsit Christiane, si ut Christianum, scripsit paganice. [...] Itaque quod ad mores attinet, maiore fructu legetur Seneca, si legatur ut, quemadmodum fuit, paganus. [...] Alioqui nusquam magis discrepat a Christiana philosophia quam cum ea tractat quae nobis sunt praecipua<sup>39</sup>.

A proponent of Stoicism is not entirely doomed to failure, though; he may have recourse to two basic strategies of making Stoic teachings palatable for a Christian, which may be applied either in separation or combined together. First, there is an option to make use of the technique of *pia interpretatio*, developed and perfected

<sup>37</sup> John of Salisbury, *Entheticus* 517–526; the text is edited by R.E. Pepin, *The „Entheticus” of John of Salisbury: a Critical Text*, „Traditio” 31 (1975), p. 127–193.

<sup>38</sup> Recalling with approval St. Jerome's recommendation of Seneca, Erasmus states: „Nihil enim huius praeceptis sanctius; tantoque ardore hortatur ad honesta, ut prorsus appareat illum hoc egisse quod praecepit.” (Erasmus, *Ep.* 325.75–77 [*Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterdami*, ed. P.S. Allen, H.M. Allen and H.W. Garrod, Oxford 1906–1958, vol. II, p. 53]): philosopher's life, as the common attitude has it, should be a witness to his doctrine.

<sup>39</sup> Erasmus, *op. cit.*, vol. VIII, p. 31 (the prefatory letter is to Peter Tomicki). See also L.A. Panizza, *Erasmus's 1515 and 1529 Editions of Seneca, and Gasparino Barzizza*, „Classical and Modern Literature” 7 (1987), p. 319–332; J. Papy, *Erasmus' and Lipsius' Editions of Seneca: A „Complementary” Project?*, „Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook” 22 (2002), pp. 10–36.

in medieval scholastic practice<sup>40</sup>. Entirely unsuitable as a means to reconstruct a philosophical system, this method of reading and interpreting an author puts emphasis on sentences and fragments excerpted from larger texts and typically interpreted without sufficient – if any – regard for their original purpose and context. This approach, beside favouring reading of collections of sentences<sup>41</sup>, is promising for enterprises like that undertaken by Agostino Steuco, viz. the search for traces of *prisca theologia*. Without any need to scrutinize every aspect of a philosophical doctrine, it allows one to make a selection of statements which may be given a Christian reinterpretation, teachings which do not fit into the overall picture being passed over in silence. To take but one example, Steuco, having summarized the 65 epistles of Seneca and embellished his narration with several quotations, sums up as follows:

Haec omnis philosophiae Senecae maxime conformis Mosaicae, de mundano primum opifice, de maiestate eius, de exordio mundi, de ideis, rerum scilicet seminibus, affluentiaque sempiterna...<sup>42</sup>.

Then, after a comparison of Seneca's cosmological enunciations and the Judaeo-Christian account of the creation, Steuco adds:

Haec cum dixerint Prophetae, Seneca ex vetusta fama apud philosophos audita confirmat. [...] Talis est Senecae divina philosophia, partim ex successione seculorum, partim luce rationis ostensa<sup>43</sup>.

A second option, freely combinable with the first one, is to cut off as much of Stoic philosophical claims deemed incompatible with Christianity as possible. It is by no accident that among newly edited Stoic texts exactly those which are concerned almost exclusively with the ethical part of Stoicism are able to gain any popularity – Epictetus' *Enchiridion*, Arrian's *Discourses*, alongside with Seneca and Cicero<sup>44</sup>. Once these options are put together, the precepts which

<sup>40</sup> See further M.D. Chenu, *Towards understanding St. Thomas*, transl. A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes, Chicago 1964; the method had been already applied on a large scale in subjecting Aristotle to a Christianizing interpretation, and subsequently to Plato as one of several ways of appropriation of his thought, see J. Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance*, 2 vols, Leiden 1991.

<sup>41</sup> On such perusal of Seneca's texts in the sixteenth century, see J. Kraye, *Stoicism in the Renaissance from Petrarch to Lipsius*, „Grotiana” 22/23 (2001/2002), p. 37-39.

<sup>42</sup> Agostino Steuco, *De perenni philosophia libri X*, Basileae: per Nicolaum Bryling et Sebastianum Francken, 1542, p. 303.

<sup>43</sup> Ibidem, p. 304. On Steuco see further Ch.B. Schmitt, *Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz*, „Journal of the History of Ideas” 27 (1966), p. 505-532; R. Delph, *Italian Humanism in the Early Reformation: Agostino Steuco (1497-1548)*, PhD thesis, University of Michigan, 1987; M. Muccillo, *La „prisca theologia” nel De perenni philosophia di Agostino Steuco*, „Rinascimento” 28 (1988), p. 41-112.

<sup>44</sup> M. Aurelius' *Meditations*, on the other hand, do not play a significant role in this phase of the reception of Stoic thought, see further J. Kraye, „*Ethnicorum omnium sanctissimus*”. Marcus

are recommended for a reader to absorb are reduced to relatively uncontroversial maxims. Hieronymus Wolf enumerates the main points in the preface to his translation of Epictetus' *Enchiridion* as follows:

Deo et naturae parendum; de omnibus, quoad possis, bene merendum; nocendum nemini; aliorum iniurias tolerandas; quicquid sine culpa nostra acciderit, aequi bonique faciendum; utendum esse his rebus quae ad vitae necessitatem dantur, quasi non utare; easdemque repetenti Deo seu Fortuna (ut vulgo loquimur) alacriter restituendas; felicitatem in animo sibi bene conscio tranquilloque reponendam; divina denique rerum humanarum administratione, ut et aequissima et sapientissima et nobis salutari, quamvis peracerba saepe videatur, acquiescendum<sup>45</sup>.

These admonitions are „horum libellorum summa”, as Wolf states; analogous advertisements are made in prefaces to other Stoic texts, as when Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations* are announced by Wilhelm Xylander in his bilingual edition of 1559 as containing considered thoughts about man's condition, contempt of death and similar subject matters – in short, „potissima ... philosophiae capita”<sup>46</sup>. When Lipsius, finally, constructs a reading programme accompanying his edition of Seneca – a set of advices carefully distributed across the prefatory *Introductio lectoris*, introductory *De vita et scriptis L. Annaei Senecae*<sup>47</sup>, and summaries preceding particular texts, together with additional notes – he frequently adverts his readers to the necessity of reading in a selective way:

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*Aurelius and his Meditations from Xylander to Diderot*, in: *Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. J. Kraye and M.W.F. Stone, London 2000, p. 107-134.

<sup>45</sup> *Epicteti Enchiridion, hoc est Pugio, sive Ars humanae vitae correctrix*, Basileae: per Ioannem Oporinum, 1561, p. 5-6. Similarly, Gregorius Haloander, prefacing the 1529 bilingual edition of *Enchiridion* with Poliziano's translation, advertises it as follows: „recte inibi atque ordine praecipitur, ut et res extra nos positae nihili pendamus, nimirum ex quibus neque boni neque mali reddamur, et quae intra nos sunt ita ad virtutem accomodemus, ne vel latum (quod aiunt) digitum a pulchro illo ac honesto discedamus. Tum quid de Deo sentiendum, in cuius voluntatem ac providentiam referenda sint omnia. Postmodo quo animo erga corpus, erga opes, erga honores; quo erga uxores, liberos patriam; quo erga nosmet ipsos esse debeamus” (*Encheiridion Epiktetou. Idem Latin per Ang[elum] Politianum*, Norenbergae: apud Ioannem Petreium, 1529, sigs A2v–A3r).

<sup>46</sup> „Id in promptu est, gravissimas in his ipsis extare de ferenda conditione humana, de contemnenda morte, de societate humana tuenda, de vera beatitudine, de causis miseriarum humanarum aliisque id genus compluribus philosophiae capitibus disputationes, easdemque iuxta argutas et exemplis comparationibusque appositissimis perpolitae”. W. Xylander, *M. Antonini imperatoris Romani et philosophi De se ipso seu de vita sua libri XII*, Tiguri: apud Andream Gesnerum, 1559, sigs A2v–B3r.

<sup>47</sup> As relevant for our immediate concerns in the present context, let it be noted that, in the narrative of Seneca's death, Lipsius is careful – having quoted the passage from Tacitus, *Annales* 15.60-64, where the story of Seneca's suicide is described – to make the following comment on Tacitus' words „tribunus nulla pavoris signa, nihil triste in verbis eius aut vultu deprensus confirmavit”: „En dignam philosopho, et quidem Stoico, mortem”. The death of a philosopher continues to reveal the reliability of his philosophical teachings. On Seneca's death, its accounts and later reception, see J. Ker, *The Deaths of Seneca*, Oxford 2009.

En habes, quae praestiti; sequitur, quid te pariter velim, a quo pauca etiam eo exactum sive rogatum. Primum, ut quamquam pleraque omnia Senecae utilia, et ad vitam, tamen quae maxime talia eligas et ea ad mentem saepius referas et ad manum<sup>48</sup>.

A second requirement is to read Seneca with philosophical and not „grammatical” intents<sup>49</sup>; finally, it is required that a reader choose fragments apt for frequent meditation:

Tertio, ut excerpta habeas et selectas aliquas sententias sive locos; quas apud te saepe agites et in animo revolvās<sup>50</sup>.

When this type of reading is applied to Stoic texts, one may go so far as to claim that Stoics are in fact closest to Christianity, as already Angelo Caninio does in his prefatory letter to the translation of Simplicius’ commentary on the *Enchiridion* (where it is also to be noted that one’s conduct during his life is taken to support his philosophical position):

Quibus de rebus multi diligenter et copiose scripserunt, et ut alios praeteream, Aristoteles omnium acuratissime; verum haud scio an ullus unquam aptius ac felicius uno Epicteto, qui hanc partem optime executus est, nec verbis modo, quod plerique omnes faciunt, sed vita quoque sua nobis bene vivendi, id est ut Natura parens praestantissima iubet, viam ostendit ac patefecit. Tam recte enim et commode de humanis, tam vere ac pie de divinis locutus est, ut neminem ad Christianae religionis certissimam veritatem magis credam accessisse<sup>51</sup>.

<sup>48</sup> L. Annaei Senecae philosophi opera quae extant omnia a Iusto Lipsio emendata et scholiis illustrata, Antverpiae: apud Ioannem Moretum 1605, p. iiiii. A list of texts particularly worth reading follows, although even they are considered unequal and require selective reading: „Inter libros eminent, me iudice, isti: *Duae Consolationes, De Providentia, De Clementia, De Tranquillitate, De Constantia, De Brevitate vitae, De vita beata*. Sunt et libri *De Ira* inter bonos, item *De Beneficiis*, sed in partibus spinas suas aut fastidia habent; alioqui et pulcherrimos ac divinos locos. In *Epistolis* simile, quarum quaedam (argumenta mea statim dicent) utilissimae; aliae in argutiis aut, si res dicenda est, ineptiis occupantur” (ibidem).

<sup>49</sup> „Secundo ut philosophi, non grammatici oculis ista legas, id est rem, non verba cogites” (ibidem).

<sup>50</sup> The lecture of Seneca is to be coupled with a careful study of Epictetus: „Huc te ducet, aut trahet potius, adiunctus Epictetus, quem lege et *Enchiridion* quidem eius edisce” (ibidem, p. v). The insistence on *sententiae* is closely connected with the stress on *meditatio* as a fundamental part of philosophical training, a preparation for *exercitatio* (both recommended in chapter 24 of the *Manuductio*): both strands of spiritual exercises, the ancient one and its Christian, or even more specifically Ignatian, transform, converge in the Christianized Stoicism of Lipsius, making its appropriation easier for his contemporaries; see further J. Papy, *Erasmus’ and Lipsius’ Editions of Seneca: A „Complementary” Project?*, p. 10-36; idem, *Lipsius’ (Neo-)Stoicism: constancy between Christian faith and Stoic virtue*, „Grotiana” 22/23 (2001/2002), p. 47-72; on ancient spiritual exercises and their relationship with early modern philosophical practice, see P. Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life. Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, transl. by M. Chase, Oxford 1995, with extensive bibliography.

<sup>51</sup> *Simplicii philosophi gravissimi commentarius in Enchiridion Epicteti, philosophi Stoici [...]* Angelo Caninio Anglariensi interprete, Venetiis: apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1546, sig. \*2r. See also J. Kraye, *Stoicism...* (n. 41 above), p. 40-41.

A conspicuous example of an entirely Christian interpretation of a Stoic notion – the concept of *virtus* – performed *via* the taking of the concept entirely away from its original context may be found in Lambert Daneau's *Ethices Christianae libri tres*. In chapter 20 of the first book, Daneau introduces a distinction between *virtus heroica* („maior quam communis hominum piorum conditio ferat”) and *virtus humana*, the latter further divided into *perfecta* and *imperfecta*<sup>52</sup>. *Virtus heroica* may be observed only in those who surpass ordinary mortals, whereas „humanam virtutem vocamus, quae ab illo summo et tam excellenti perfectionis gradu, de quo diximus, differt et in communi hominum, qui et boni et probi appellantur, natura et sorte spectanda est”<sup>53</sup>, Daneau explains, and proceeds to invoke, building on Cicero's *De officiis* and *De finibus*, the distinction between *katorthomata* and *kathekonta*, which is interpreted in a Christian way:

Aut enim eo usque progressa esse statuitur vis illa contentioque animi nostri a Spiritu sancto indita, ut omnem affectionis virtuti contrariae impetum extinxerit in nobis; aut non est progressa eo usque, sed in eo tantum gradu totus conatus animi nostri (qui et ipse a Deo nobis infusus est) substitit, ut in agendo bono opere luctam adhuc et pugnam cum repugnante et adversante virtuti impetu et affectu sustineamus<sup>54</sup>.

Whether in search for a maximally systematic, as with Lipsius, or only very partial, as with Daneau, combination of Christianity and Stoicism, an encounter with yet more fundamental obstacles is sooner or later inevitable.

The founders of Stoicism were careful to stress the fact that their philosophical teaching forms an integral whole whose parts cannot be detached without a concomitant loss in their plausibility and coherence; as fragments which survive attest, several organic metaphors served this aim, usefully collected by Sextus Empiricus:

[Stoici] admodum probabiliter areae, quae fructus omne genus continet, assimilant philosophiam, ut arborum quidem proceritati comparetur pars naturalis, fructuum autem maturitati et suavitati pars quae pertinet ad mores; parietum autem firmitati logica. Alii autem dicunt eam esse ovo similem. Nam vitello quidem, quem nonnulli dicunt esse pullum, similem esse eam quae pertinet ad mores; albumini autem, quod est alimentum vitelli, partem naturalem; externae autem testae logicam. Posidonius autem, quoniam philosophiae partes sunt inter se inseparabiles [...]

<sup>52</sup> L. Daneau, *Ethices Christianae libri tres*, Genevae: apud Eusthatium Vignon, 1582 (the first edition appeared in 1577), I.20 (sig. 97r). On Daneau, see further Ch. Strohm, *Ethik im frühen Calvinismus*, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996; R. Saarinen, *Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought*, Oxford 2011, p. 188-200.

<sup>53</sup> Ibidem, III.22 (sig. 99v).

<sup>54</sup> Ibidem, III.22 (sigs 99v-100r). For a discussion of the Ciceronian passage in *De officiis*, 1.8 (sometimes athetized by modern editors), together with a broader discussion of the distinction, see Dyck's commentary ad loc. (A. Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero. De officiis*, University of Michigan Press 1996); the Renaissance struggle for a correct interpretation of the term *katorthoma* is told in J. Krayer, *Cicero, Stoicism and Textual Criticism. Poliziano on Katorthoma*, „Rinascimento” 23 (1983), p. 79-110.



maluit philosophiam assimilare animali: sanguini quidem et carnibus partem naturalem, ossibus autem et nervis logicam, animae autem eam partem quae pertinet ad mores<sup>55</sup>.

The interdependence of logical, physical and moral doctrines has as a result a particularly close relationship between Stoic ethics and their physics, comprising theology, as already Chrysippus is fond of pointing out<sup>56</sup>: Stoic ethics cannot be divorced from Stoic physics, if their ethical doctrines, (in)famous paradoxes included, are to be fully accepted and adopted in one's life; even more, adoption of the whole body of their physical teachings may be at least on some interpretations considered a prerequisite for a proper understanding of their ethical doctrine<sup>57</sup>. Whichever direction is taken as appropriate, whether one takes physics or ethics as the starting point<sup>58</sup>, their close relationship presents an obstacle to adoption of a Stoic position without thereby importing elements fundamentally incompatible with Christianity. Of particular relevance is the connection between the whole complex of Stoic teachings related to fate and necessity on the one hand, and the body of Christian doctrines on free will and providence. Its importance is highlighted by the motto which Kochanowski adopts for his poetical cycle, viz. Cicero's translation of Homer's *Odyssey* 18.136-137: „tales sunt hominum mentes, quali pater ipse / Iuppiter auctiferas lustravit lumine terras". As both the exact wording of the quotation accepted by Kochanowski and subsequent

<sup>55</sup> Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* 7.16; Latin translation quoted above comes from the edition of Gentian Hervet's translation of *Adversus mathematicos*, published together with Henri Estienne's translation of *Pyrrhonian Outlines* in Paris in 1569. On Latin translations of Sextus Empiricus, see L. Floridi, *Sextus Empiricus: the Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism*, Oxford 2002. The collection of fragments of the Stoa relevant for the understanding of philosophy as an organic unity may be found in *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. J. von Arnim, Stuttgart 1964, vol. 2, fragments 35-44.

<sup>56</sup> Chrysippus' views on the matter are easily accessible due to the fact that relevant fragments are preserved by Plutarch in his *De Stoicorum repugnantiis*, a part of *Moralia* already quoted above (see Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 1035 A-F and *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. cit., vol. 2, fragments 30, 42, 53; vol. 3, fragments 68 and 326). The issue is further discussed in G. Verbeke, *Ethics and logic in Stoicism*, in: *Atoms, pneuma and tranquillity. Epicurean and Stoic themes in European thought*, ed. M.J. Osler, Cambridge 1991, p. 11-24.

<sup>57</sup> This interpretation of the relationship between Stoic ethics and physics has been recently defended by A.A. Long, see his *Stoic eudaimonism*, in: *Proceedings of the 1988 Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 4, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989, p. 77-101, reprinted in: idem, *Stoic studies*, Cambridge 1996, p. 179-201; further idem, *Epictetus. A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life*, Oxford 2004, p. 180-206; idem, *From Epicurus to Epictetus. Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy*, Oxford 2006, p. 24-25. For a relevant discussion and complications of the picture, see J. Annas, *The Morality of Happiness*, Oxford 1993, p. 159-179 (with further bibliography).

<sup>58</sup> Apparent vacillations in Chrysippus' views as recorded by Plutarch (n. 56 above) might be due to differences of issues for which the order of logic, physics and ethics had to be established: as succinctly stated in *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (above, n. 56) vol. 2 p. 17, *Potest etiam illa ratio ad ordinem discendi, haec ad ipsum referri rerum ordinem*.

changes made by later editors attest, it is clear for Renaissance readers where these verses actually come from – they are preserved as a quotation made by St. Augustine in his discussion of the Stoic conception of fate in the fifth book of *De civitate Dei*<sup>59</sup>. Augustine cites Ciceronian translation as a part of an argument that the Stoic notion of fate may be reduced to the Christian conception of God's will; after a quotation from Seneca (who himself translates Cleanthes in the *Epistle* 107), he continues:

Illi quoque versus Homerici huic sententiae suffragantur, quos Cicero in Latinum vertit: *Tales sunt hominum mentes, quali pater ipse Iuppiter auctiferas lustravit lumine terras*. Nec in hac quaestione auctoritatem haberet poetica sententia; sed quoniam Stoicos dicit vim fati asserentes istos ex Homero versus solere usurpare, non de illius poetae, sed de istorum philosophorum opinione tractatur, cum per istos versus, quos disputationi adhibent quam de fato habent, quid sentiant esse fatum apertissime declaratur, quoniam Iovem appellant, quem summum deum putant, a quo connexionem dicunt pendere fatorum<sup>60</sup>.

It is to Augustine that Lipsius refers discussing the notions of fate, providence and the freedom of God's will:

Quod Augustino etiam arbitro dicam. Qui reiecto *fato astrologorum* infert: *At qui omnium connexionem seriemque causarum, qua fit omne quod fit, fati nomine appellant* (ii sunt nostri:) *non multum cum eis de verbi controversia laborandum atque certandum est: quandoquidem ipsum causarum ordinem et quandam connexionem Dei summi tribuunt voluntati*. Addit alia, et alibi ex ipso Seneca approbat hanc eorum mentem esse<sup>61</sup>.

The reference to Augustine strengthens the reinterpretation of Stoic notions – those of crucial importance for the Christian position – that Lipsius is eager to support; at the same time, it exemplifies the strategy to extract Stoic statements out their context and thereby to give them meanings quite different from the original position. It is only fair to state that „Lipsius' compatibilism is barely more than asserted”<sup>62</sup>. The difficulty is much more serious than it is with excessively high demands imposed on adepts of Stoicism – as we have seen, the latter may be suitably reinterpreted so as to become in essence only general goals, whose fulfilment, although desirable, should not be expected from an ordinary man; if required, they may be also reinterpreted entirely within a Christian framework,

<sup>59</sup> The story of Kochanowski's motto is given in detail in M. Cytowska, *Nad „Trenami” Jana Kochanowskiego. Od motta do genezy poematu*, „Pamiętnik Literacki” 70 (1979), p. 181-186.

<sup>60</sup> Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 5.8.

<sup>61</sup> Lipsius, *Physiologiae Stoicorum libri* I.12, p. 31-32.

<sup>62</sup> J. Sutton, *Religion and the Failures of Determinism*, in: *The Uses of Antiquity: the scientific revolution and the classical tradition*, ed. S. Gaukroger, Dordrecht 1991, p. 25-51 (here p. 27). For an extensive treatment of Stoic teachings on determinism, see S. Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*, Oxford 1998; for a broader picture, see R. Sorabji, *Necessity, cause and blame. Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory*, Ithaca 1980, p. 45-88.

as the case of Daneau testifies. The trouble was also more difficult to overcome than in the case of Aristotle or Plato: the former had already undergone extensive exegetical activity and tensions had been for the major part solved, and, besides, the very nature of Aristotelian corpus had also helped to separate parts more apt for a Christianizing interpretation; the latter had experienced an analogous process, if on a lesser scale, and a Christian path had also been cloven through the forest of his dialogues. The most systematic proponent of Christianized Stoicism, Lipsius, is well aware of the holistic nature of the Stoic doctrine, and makes use of an analogous metaphor to convey the internal coherence and inseparability of Stoic claims:

[...] ad decreta nostra redeamus, quorum radicem heri vidimus et truncum. Iam ex isto ecce rami et ramuli adsurgunt mira serie nexi. Proprium hoc Stoicorum, vincire omnia et quasi anulos nectere in catena, ut non ordo solum, sed sequela et cohaesio sit rerum<sup>63</sup>.

When it comes to the execution of such philosophical project, however, Lipsius is forced either to pass in silence over Stoic claims which are blatantly resistant to a Christian interpretation, or to apply tacitly exegetical strategies which substantially change the content of philosophical assertions made with quite different intents and in very different contexts – suffice it to mention an all-important reinterpretation of the term *natura*:

Natura totum sinum suum offert et pandit: supera, media, infera, caelum, terras, ignem, aquas, aera, quidquid iis continetur, Deum, genios, homines. [...] Naturam dixi, intellego Deum<sup>64</sup>.

Consistently applied to Stoic natural philosophy, this interpretation – for which Lipsius is also able to cite early Christian precedents – implies deep changes in the naturalistic thought of Stoics. Lipsius does not hide the transformative nature of his exposition, nor does he shy from stating his aims explicitly. Already prefacing a reedition of *De constantia* with *Ad lectorem pro constantia mea praescriptio*, Lipsius addresses charges against his philosophical proposal outlined in the dialogue which follows:

Negant satis pie hoc argumentum a me tractatum [...]. Parum pie ideo, quia philosophum tantum egisse videor, iniquunt, nec inspersisse quae potui et debui e libris sacris<sup>65</sup>.

<sup>63</sup> Lipsius, *Manuductio* III.1 (n. 36 above). Lipsius proceeds to quote Cicero's *De finibus* 5.83, wherein he finds an expression of an analogous feeling. On relations between Polish intellectual world and Lipsius and reception of his work, see A. Borowski, *Justus Lipsius and the Classical Tradition in Poland*, in: *Iustus Lipsius, Europae lumen et columen*, ed. G. Tourmoy, J. Landtsheer and J. Papy, Leuven 1999, p. 1-16.

<sup>64</sup> Lipsius, *Physiologiae Stoicorum libri tres*, Antverpiae: apud Ioannem Moretum, 1604, I.2, p. 3.

<sup>65</sup> Lipsius, *De constantia*, Antverpiae: apud Christophorum Plantinum, 1586, fol. \*2r.

His aim is not to invade the terrain of theology, Lipsius claims; he is a philosopher – and as a philosopher, he professes not to resuscitate an ancient doctrine, but to proceed selectively:

Ex his effectum volui, nec homini uni, imo nec sectae districte adhaerendum. Quae servitus ista sit? Alius iugum subeat: tu mecum, sive cum Seneca, aude profari: *Non me cuiquam mancipavi, nullius nomen fero. Multorum magnorum virorum iudicio tribuo, aliquid et meo vindico. Quodsi omnino lubet partiarium esse, una secta est in quam, me iudice, tuto nomen demus. Ea es eklektike (electivam liceat reddere)...*<sup>66</sup>.

An attempt to build a Christian version of Stoicism requires – despite a generally systemic approach of Lipsius – a radical change, disrupting the unity of the Stoic vision of the world, imposing an entirely different conceptual scheme on separated parts of an originally strongly interconnected system<sup>67</sup>. The ultimate failure of Cicero in *Lament 16* is indicative of the impossibility of doing otherwise: in the search for an encompassing worldview, a decisive choice has to be made. It is done in *Lament 17*, where both matter and form become distinctively and unequivocally Christian.

### **Kochanowski, *Lament 16.29-32*: Cicero and his ultimate failure**

**Keywords:** Jan Kochanowski, Marcus Tullius Cicero, stoicism, Laments

#### S u m m a r y

The present paper investigates the sources and ramifications of the reference to Cicero's death in Kochanowski's *Lament 16.29-32*. Supplementing information provided by existing commentaries on *Laments*, it is argued that the reference is made to the judgement on Cicero's last hours in Plutarch's *Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero*. The divergence from the main current of the biographical tradition of Cicero's death, mostly favourable to him, is put into the context of the complex Renaissance discussion about the philosophy of Cicero, acceptability of Stoicism, and the relationship between ancient philosophy and Christianity.

<sup>66</sup> *Manuductio* I.5, p. 12.

<sup>67</sup> For extensive comments on the Neostoic treatment of Stoic teachings, see A.A. Long, *Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler*, in B. Inwood (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 365-392; J. Papy, *Lipsius' (Neo-)Stoicism...* (n. 50 above); for remarks on the influence of Stoicism on early modern science, see P. Barker, *Stoic contributions to early modern science*, in M.J. Osler (ed.), *Atoms, pneuma and tranquillity...* (n. 56 above), p. 135-154.

**Tren XVI Kochanowskiego: odwołanie do śmierci Cyncerona**

Słowa kluczowe: Jan Kochanowski, Marcus Tullius Cicero, stoicyzm, treny

## Streszczenie

Artykuł przedstawia wyniki badań nad źródłami oraz następstwami odniesienia do śmierci Cyncerona w *Trenie XVI* Jana Kochanowskiego (w. 29-32). Dopełniając informacje zawarte w dotychczasowych komentarzach do *Trenów*, autor dowodzi, że Kochanowski odwołuje się tu do oceny ostatnich godzin Cyncerona wyrażonej przez Plutarcha w *Porównaniu Demostenesa i Cyncerona*. Odchylenie od głównego nurtu biograficznej tradycji, w którym śmierć Cyncerona ukazywano w korzystnym dla niego świetle, zostało umieszczone w kontekście złożonej renesansowej dyskusji o filozofii Cyncerona, możliwości przyjęcia stoicyzmu i relacji pomiędzy filozofią starożytną a chrześcijaństwem.